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REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS AND 
THE ADA AMENDMENTS’ OVERLOOKED POTENTIAL 
Jeannette Cox* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is “a dearth of precedent” outlining the scope of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act’s reasonable accommodations provision.1 The “little 
precedent”2 available “remains severely underdeveloped,”3 “in a state of 
chaos,”4 and leaves “many issues unresolved.”5 Circuit splits abound. For ex-
ample, courts widely differ in their perspectives about whether the ADA re-
quires employers to permit employees with disabilities to work from home.6 
Similarly, in circumstances in which an employee with a disability can no 
longer do his or her current job, courts differ on the question of whether the 
ADA requires the employer to prefer the employee with a disability for va-
cant positions within the employer’s organization.7 
  
 * Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. I thank Bradley Areheart, Samuel Ba-
genstos, Ravi Malhotra, Sandra Sperino, and Noah Zatz for helpful comments. I also thank the participants 
of the Tenth Annual Colloquium on Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law held at Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law Faculty Colloquium Series, the Uni-
versity of Dayton Faculty Colloquium Series, the Ohio Legal Scholars’ Workshop held at The Ohio State 
University Moritz College of Law, the 28th Annual Meeting of the Society for Disability Studies, and the 
2016 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association. 
 1 Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 714 (2014). 
 2 Id. at 713. 
 3 Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1122 
(2010). 
 4 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 527, 543 (2013); see also id. at 546 (“[T]he case law demonstrates that trying to predict whether an 
accommodation will be deemed reasonable is difficult.”). 
 5 Stein et al., supra note 1, at 714. 
 6 Porter, supra note 4, at 549 (observing that a “hopelessly muddled accommodation involves an 
employee who requests to work from home.”) (footnote omitted); see id. at 549–51 (collecting cases). 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and the 
ADA: The Implications of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 
1–2 (2002) [hereinafter Anderson, “Neutral” Policies] (“One of the most controversial provisions of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the duty to reassign an employee with disabilities to a vacant 
position as a form of reasonable accommodation.”) (footnote omitted); Stephen F. Befort & Tracey 
Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, 
Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1056 (2000) (“Of all the accommodations 
listed in the ADA, the reassignment accommodation has generated the most litigation and fueled the 
greatest amount of controversy.”) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide this 
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These and other questions about the scope of the ADA’s reasonable ac-
commodations provision remain unresolved because the first two decades of 
judicial opinions construing the ADA did not focus on defining the reasona-
ble accommodations provision. Instead, courts concluded that the vast ma-
jority of ADA plaintiffs were not “disabled enough” to bring ADA claims.8 
Commentators labeled this phenomenon the “ADA backlash” and speculated 
that it was fueled by judicial discomfort with the obligations that the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodations provision placed on employers.9 
Today, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008’s dramatic expansion of the 
ADA’s protected class requires courts to directly confront the many unre-
solved questions about the breadth of the ADA’s reasonable accommoda-
tions provision. In virtually all cases, courts can no longer avoid delineating 
the scope of an employer’s accommodations obligation by concluding that 
the plaintiff is ineligible to bring a reasonable accommodations claim.10  
To date, academic commentary has assumed that courts will respond to 
the ADA’s expanded protected class by constricting reasonable accommoda-
tions law. Commentators reason that the same discomfort with the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodations provision that motivated judicial constriction of 
the ADA’s protected class will now prompt courts to constrict the law of 
reasonable accommodations itself.11 One commentator, Nicole Porter, has 
  
issue but subsequently dismissed the case when the parties settled. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
552 U.S. 1136 (2008) (dismissing writ of certiorari).  
 8 See, e.g., Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA’s “Majority Life Activity” 
Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 180 (1999). 
 9 See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 96–125 (2005); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights 
Model, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 62, 64–65 (Linda H. 
Krieger ed., 2006); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT 54–55 (2005); Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Dis-
ability Backlash and the ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1268, 1272 (2009) [hereinafter 
Anderson, Ideological Dissonance]; Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 315, 
317–20 (2009). 
 10 See Porter, supra note 4, at 543 (“[B]ecause more cases will proceed past the initial inquiry into 
whether an individual has a disability, more courts will have to determine what constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation. . . . [T]his issue is in a state of chaos.”) (footnote omitted). 
 11 See, e.g., Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, supra note 9, at 1284 (“One thing is clear—the 
ADAAA should finally move the judicial focus away from the definitional stage and onto the substantive 
rights granted under the statute. Courts should begin to address more questions of what is discrimination 
on the basis of disability, and what is a reasonable accommodation. As they do, we will see whether the 
restrictive interpretations have simply been shifted from one arena to another.”). 
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marshaled persuasive evidence that this has already occurred.12 She con-
cludes that the amendments have triggered “a new ADA backlash” targeted 
at the ADA’s reasonable accommodations provision.13  
This article offers a dramatically different—and much more optimis-
tic—perspective about the amendments’ effect on reasonable accommoda-
tions law. It contends that the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) holds the 
potential to not only stop the backlash Porter has identified, but to affirma-
tively expand reasonable accommodations law. When integrated with preex-
isting ADA provisions, the peculiar method by which the ADAAA enlarges 
the ADA’s protected class provides an unexpected new argument in favor of 
broadening current judicial constructions of the reasonable accommodations 
provision.  
This argument requires some explication because it is not obvious on 
the face of the ADAAA. The sole ADAAA provision that changes the law 
surrounding reasonable accommodations implements a political compromise 
supporters believed necessary to garner sufficient support to pass the 
ADAAA:14 it provides that a subset of the ADA’s newly admitted class mem-
bers may not bring reasonable accommodations claims.15 In this way, the 
ADAAA for the first time divides the ADA’s protected class into two groups: 
“tier one” plaintiffs who may bring reasonable accommodations claims and 
“tier two” plaintiffs who may not.16  
Standing alone, this stratification of the ADA’s protected class has little 
apparent effect on the scope of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations pro-
vision. However, when integrated with existing ADA provisions, the 
ADAAA’s stratified protected class casts a spotlight on the ADA claims that 
“tier two” plaintiffs may access. The significant overlap between these non-
accommodations claims and reasonable accommodations claims suggests 
that courts should interpret the reasonable accommodations provision 
broadly in order to fulfill congressional intent to provide “tier one” plaintiffs 
more statutory muscle to compel workplace change.17 
This argument proceeds as follows. Part I examines the ADAAA’s strat-
ification of the ADA’s protected class. Part II identifies the claims available 
  
 12 Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (identifying “a 
new backlash against the ADA”). 
 13 Id. at 7. 
 14 Stephan F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvig-
orate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 4 UTAH L. REV. 993, 994–95 & 
nn.20–21 (2010). 
 15 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h) (2012) (providing that covered entities “need not provide a reasonable 
accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual who 
meets the definition of disability in section 12102(1) solely under subparagraph (C) of such section.”). 
 16 See discussion infra Part I. 
 17 See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded as” Prong: Giving Effect to Con-
gressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 588–90 (1997). 
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to “tier two” class members, whom the ADAAA denies reasonable accom-
modations. Although these claims have seen little use to date, close attention 
to their text and history reveals that the widespread assumption that these 
provisions have little utility is based on unjustified comparison to Title VII’s 
disparate impact provisions,18 which involve limitations inapplicable to the 
ADA. In reality, the ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions signifi-
cantly overlap current reasonable accommodations doctrine.  
Finally, Part III argues that the ability of “tier two” plaintiffs to obtain 
workplace changes similar to reasonable accommodations provides a path to 
resolve some of the most intractable questions about the scope of reasonable 
accommodations. In order to effectuate congressional intent to provide the 
two different tiers of ADA plaintiffs different statutory benefits, courts 
should conclude that the ADA’s reasonable accommodations provision does 
not merely overlap the provisions available to “tier two” plaintiffs, but ex-
tends beyond them.  
I. THE AMENDED ADA'S STRATIFIED PROTECTED CLASS 
This article uses the terms “tier one” and “tier two” to describe the di-
vide the ADAAA creates between plaintiffs eligible to bring reasonable ac-
commodations claims and plaintiffs ineligible to do so. “Tier one” plaintiffs, 
who may bring reasonable accommodations claims, must have “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities 
of such individual.”19 “Tier two” plaintiffs, by contrast, must instead simply 
have a “physical or mental impairment.”20 They need not prove that their im-
pairments limit any of their life activities.21  
This stratification did not exist prior to the ADAAA, which became ef-
fective in 2009.22 During the nearly two decades between the ADA’s original 
enactment and the ADAAA, an ADA plaintiff had to meet the first definition 
(“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities”23) not only to bring a reasonable accommodations claim, but 
also to bring all other ADA claims.24 In other words, all ADA plaintiffs were 
  
 18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
 19 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). Although outside the scope of this article, a plaintiff may also 
establish “tier one” status by demonstrating that he or she has “a record” of “a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Id. § 12102(1)(A), (B). 
 20 See id. § 12102(3). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Opportunity Fact Sheet on the EEOC’s Final Regulations Implementing the ADAAA, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T COMM’N, https://www1.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/adaaa_fact_sheet.cfm? (last visited Aug. 8, 
2016). 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
 24 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). 
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“tier one” plaintiffs because individuals whose impairments were not sub-
stantially limiting simply fell outside the ADA’s scope. 
The only significant exception was a circuit split involving individuals 
who obtained ADA coverage solely via the ADA’s “regarded as” provision, 
which focuses not on the individual’s actual physical or mental condition but 
on the defendant’s perception that the plaintiff has a physical or mental im-
pairment.25 Under this provision, a plaintiff without a substantially limiting 
impairment could establish ADA class membership by demonstrating that 
the defendant regarded him or her as having a substantially limiting impair-
ment.26 Some courts relied on a literal textual reading of the ADA to conclude 
that these plaintiffs were eligible for reasonable accommodations even 
though they did not actually have an impairment that substantially limited 
one or more major life activities.27 This conclusion garnered criticism, how-
ever, because permitting employer misperceptions to trigger accommoda-
tions eligibility appeared unfair to persons with identical physical or mental 
conditions who were ineligible for accommodations because they were not 
similarly misperceived.28 Due to this critique, another set of courts concluded 
that “regarded as” plaintiffs could not bring claims for reasonable accommo-
dations.29 In this way, these courts anticipated the ultimate “tier one” and “tier 
two” approach that the ADAAA adopts.  
The ADAAA resolved the circuit split by restricting accommodations 
eligibility to persons who have one or more actual (not merely perceived) 
substantially limiting impairments.30 This change does not disadvantage most 
of the individuals who had benefitted from the plaintiff-friendly side of the 
pre-ADAAA circuit split, however, because the ADAAA’s more central pro-
visions dramatically expand the scope of “major life activities” and direct 
courts and the EEOC to broadly construe the phrase “substantially limits.”31 
  
 25 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2006) (“The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual . . . 
being regarded as having such an impairment.”). 
 26 See id. Another, far more minor exception, may be found by inference from 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(4) (2006), which permits individuals without any impairment to sue for discrimination they 
experience due to their association with an ADA-eligible individual. 
 27 See, e.g., D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005); Kelly v. 
Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 
F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 28 See Travis, supra note 9, at 332; see also Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stack-
ing the Deck? The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 
906–07 (2000). 
 29 See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber v. 
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h) (2012). 
 31 Id. §12102(4)(A)–(B); see also Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 201–02 (2010). 
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Accordingly, the vast majority of individuals in need of reasonable accom-
modations now qualify for them because they fit within the ADA’s broad-
ened “tier one” protected class.32  
This article focuses on a lesser-known effect of the ADAAA’s revision 
of the “regarded as” provision. In a sharp break with the past, the ADAAA 
creates a “tier two” category of ADA class members who may establish ADA 
class membership on the basis of impairment alone.33 In other words, individ-
uals with one or more impairments but no substantial limitation on any major 
life activity may bring all ADA claims except reasonable accommodations. 
The sole restriction is that the impairment cannot be both “transitory and mi-
nor.”34 The statute defines a transitory impairment as “an impairment with an 
actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”35 Persons covered by this 
new portion of the ADA may include individuals with impairments as com-
monplace as mild seasonal allergies.36 
This change has been underappreciated because the ADAAA’s textual 
structure obscures it. Rather than pointedly stating that an impairment suf-
fices to enable plaintiffs to bring all ADA claims other than reasonable ac-
commodations, the ADAAA somewhat confusingly grafts individuals with 
non-substantially limiting impairments into the “regarded as” portion of the 
disability definition. As amended, the statute provides: 
(1) The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph 
(3)).37 
This definitional paragraph does not expressly indicate that persons with non-
substantially limiting impairments may bring ADA claims, but instead points 
  
 32 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C), (3) (2012). 
 33 See id. § 12102(3). 
 34 See id. § 12102(3)(B). 
 35 Id.; see also Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10-cv-3812 (KAM)(LB), 2012 WL 139255, at 
*1–2, *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2012) (concluding that shoulder and back injuries that required a three month 
leave were not “minor”); Gaus v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 09-1698, 2011 WL 4527359, at *17 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 28, 2011) (concluding that chronic pain in joint, hands, and hip lasting over a year was not “transi-
tory”). But see Zurenda v. Cardiology Assocs., 3:10–CV–0882, 2012 WL 1801740, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 
16, 2012) (concluding that a knee surgery with a 6 to 12 month recovery was “transitory and minor”) 
Lewis v. Fla. Default Law Grp., No. 8:10-cv-1182-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL 4527456, at *5–7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 
16, 2011) (concluding that flu is “transitory and minor”). 
 36 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY, ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 (2008), http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/110-2/saphr3195-r.pdf (suggesting that the ADA now covers “a 
mild seasonal allergy”).  
 37 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). 
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to paragraph 3, which is labeled “Regarded as having such an impairment.”38 
Paragraph 3 provides, in relevant part: 
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impair-
ment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action 
prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.39 
This provision awkwardly clusters three groups of plaintiffs within the 
“regarded as” heading. The first group is familiar because it has enjoyed 
ADA coverage since the ADA’s inception: it consists of persons whose em-
ployers believe them to have a substantially limiting impairment.40 This is the 
group that was subject to the pre-ADAAA circuit split about whether “re-
garded as” plaintiffs may receive reasonable accommodations.41 The other 
two groups are new. One consists of persons who are regarded by their em-
ployers as having a non-substantially limiting impairment.42 The final group, 
which is most likely the largest, does not fit comfortably under the “regarded 
as” heading. Persons within this group obtain ADA coverage by demonstrat-
ing that they have “an actual . . . physical or mental impairment.”43 They do 
not need to demonstrate that their impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity.44 They also do not need to demonstrate that their employer errone-
ously believed that their impairment substantially limited a major life activ-
ity.45 
Unfortunately, Congress’s choice to place persons with actual, non-sub-
stantially limiting impairments under the “regarded as” heading has caused 
some courts to overlook the fact that the ADAAA grants “tier two” class 
membership on the basis of impairment alone. In at least two cases purport-
ing to apply the ADAAA, courts have erroneously held that a plaintiff with 
a non-substantially limiting impairment had to prove that his employer be-
lieved that his impairment substantially limited a major life activity in order 
  
 38 See id. § 12102(3). 
 39 Id. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
 40 See supra notes 22–29 and accompanying text. 
 41 See cases cited supra at notes 27, 29. 
 42 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012). 
 43 Id. (emphasis added) 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id. 
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to obtain ADA coverage.46 The error is stark: in both opinions, the courts’ 
recitation of facts states that the plaintiff had an actual impairment.47  
Despite this risk for error, the statutory clustering of these three dispar-
ate groups of ADA plaintiffs has some logic because the three groups share 
a common feature: the ADAAA denies reasonable accommodations claims 
to all three.48 Accordingly, this article uses the term “tier two” to describe all 
three categories of individuals the ADAAA makes ineligible for reasonable 
accommodations. The primary focus, however, is on individuals who have 
an actual impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity. 
II. CLAIMS AVAILABLE TO “TIER TWO” PLAINTIFFS  
Congress’s choice to deny “tier two” class members access to the 
ADA’s reasonable accommodations provision gives new significance to the 
ADA’s other effects-based discrimination claims.49 Much like the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodations provision, the ADA’s other effects-based dis-
crimination provisions do not require a plaintiff to prove that the employer 
intended to discriminate; the plaintiff must simply establish that an employer 
policy imposes disadvantage on the basis of disability.50 If the plaintiff does 
so, the employer may avoid liability only by proving that the challenged pol-
icy is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.51  
This Part first outlines the often-overlooked effects-based discrimina-
tion provisions that accompany the ADA’s reasonable accommodations pro-
vision. It then demonstrates that “tier two” ADA class members may rely on 
  
 46 See McBride v. Amer Tech., Inc., No. SA–12–CV–00489–DAE, 2013 WL 2541595, *5, *8–9 
(W.D. Tex. June 10, 2013) (although quoting the new statutory language and acknowledging that the 
plaintiff’s direct supervisor “stated in his affidavit: ‘I knew [Plaintiff] had Tourettes,’” the court granted 
summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove he “was regarded as having an 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.”); O’Donnell v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20, 
No. 12-6529, 2013 WL 1234813, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013) (erroneously concluding that “a plaintiff 
is still required to plead the existence of a substantial limitation on a major life activity, either because the 
employer mistakenly believed he had a non-existent impairment that caused one, or because the employer 
believed an actual impairment caused one, when it in fact did not.”). 
 47 See McBride, 2013 WL 2541595, *1; O’Donnell, 2013 WL 1234813, at *1. 
 48 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h) (2012). 
 49 See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination 
Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 37 n.172 (2005) (“Under the ADA, plaintiffs are not limited to the 
accommodation theory of discrimination, but may use the disparate impact theory as well.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Pamela S. Karland & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 n.20 (1996) (noting that the ADA “essentially codif[ies] the theory of 
disparate impact.”) (citations omitted). 
 50 Travis, supra note 49, at 37–38. 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (2012) (stating that if the plaintiff is eligible for reasonable accommodations, 
the employer must also demonstrate that reasonable accommodation is not possible). 
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these effects-based discrimination provisions to obtain workplace changes 
that resemble reasonable accommodations. 
A. The ADA’s Effects-Based Discrimination Provisions 
Four effects-based discrimination provisions appear alongside the rea-
sonable accommodations provision in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).52 Sec-
tion 12112(b)(1) prohibits employers from “limiting, segregating, or classi-
fying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the oppor-
tunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of 
such applicant or employee.”53 This language mirrors the provision that gov-
erns race and sex disparate impact claims in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.54 Similarly, § 12112(b)(3) prohibits employers from “utilizing 
standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of dis-
crimination on the basis of disability.”55 Additionally, § 12112(b)(6) requires 
employers to demonstrate that selection criteria that screen out individuals 
with disabilities (or a single individual with a disability) be job-related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.56 Similarly, 
§ 12112(b)(7) requires employers to ensure that “tests concerning employ-
ment” do not unnecessarily adversely affect job applicants or employees with 
disabilities that “impair[] sensory, manual, or speaking skills.”57 
These provisions, which surround the reasonable accommodations pro-
vision (located in § 12112(b)(5)), function similarly to Title VII disparate 
impact claims.58 They permit an individual to not only challenge selection 
criteria that directly target his or her disability, such as vision or hearing tests, 
but also selection criteria that have the effect of imposing disadvantage on 
the basis of disability.59 For example, they allow an individual with a vision 
  
 52 Id. § 12112(b). 
 53 Id. § 12112(b)(1).  
 54 See id. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 55 Id. § 12112(b)(3). 
 56 Id. § 12112(b)(6). 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (2012). 
 58 See id. § 2000e-2. 
 59 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 105 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 388 
(“[T]his subsection prohibits the imposition of criteria that ‘tend to’ screen out an individual with a disa-
bility. This concept, drawn from current regulations under Section 504 (See, e.g.[,] 45 C.F.R. 84.13), 
makes it discriminatory to impose policies or criteria that, while not creating a direct bar to individuals 
with disabilities, diminish such individuals’ chances of participation.”). 
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impairment to challenge a facially neutral requirement that job applicants 
present a driver’s license.60  
Both courts and litigants have frequently overlooked these effects-based 
discrimination provisions.61 Despite the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement 
in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez62 that “disparate-impact claims are cognizable 
under the ADA,”63 most academic commentary has given little attention to 
the ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions.64 Judicial opinions de-
scribing the claims available to ADA employment discrimination plaintiffs 
frequently list only intentional discrimination and reasonable accommoda-
tions claims.65 The few commentators who have discussed the ADA’s effects-
based discrimination provisions have observed that “almost no ADA disabil-
ity disparate impact cases exist” in the employment discrimination context.66  
Prior to the ADAAA, this tendency to overlook the ADA’s effects-
based discrimination provisions was natural because, at that time, all ADA 
class members were eligible for reasonable accommodations.67 Given the op-
tion between effects-based discrimination claims and reasonable accommo-
dations claims, plaintiffs naturally chose reasonable accommodations claims 
  
 60 See id. (“Such diminution of opportunity to participate can take a number of different forms. If, 
for example, a drugstore refuses to accept checks to pay for prescription drugs unless an individual pre-
sents a driver’s license, and no other form of identification is acceptable, the store is not imposing a cri-
terion that identifies or mentions disability. But for many individuals with visual impairments, and various 
other disabilities, this policy will operate to deny them access to the service available to other customers; 
people with disabilities will be disproportionately screened out.”). 
 61 See Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 203 (2005) (“Perhaps because disparate impact is similar to the duty of reason-
able accommodation, courts frequently overlook it as a viable theory of discrimination under the ADA.”) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 62 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
 63 Id. at 53. 
 64 But see James Leonard, The Equality Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts 
has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2005) (briefly discussing 
the ADA’s disparate impact provisions); Timmons, supra note 61, at 251 (observing that “it is easier for 
a plaintiff to prove disparate impact under the ADA than it is under Title VII because the ADA allows 
individually focused disparate impact claims. Rather than needing to produce statistical evidence showing 
that the challenged policy disqualified or excluded a disproportionate number of persons in a protected 
group, an ADA plaintiff need prove only that the policy had an adverse effect on the plaintiff because of 
his or her disabilities.”) (footnote omitted).  
 65 See, e.g., Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Under the ADA, 
two distinct categories of disability discrimination claims exist: failure to accommodate and disparate 
treatment.”); EEOC v. Eckerd Corp., No. 1:10–cv–2816–JEC, 2012 WL 2726766, at *4 (N.D. Ga. July 9, 
2012) (“[T]here are two distinct categories of disability discrimination claims under the ADA: (1) failure 
to accommodate and (2) disparate treatment.”). 
 66 Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1240 n.101 (2003).  
 67 As previously discussed, the sole exception was that some circuits held that plaintiffs who estab-
lished ADA class membership solely though the “regarded as” provision could not sue for reasonable 
accommodations. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
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because effects-based discrimination claims held no potential to generate 
compensatory and punitive damages.68  
After the ADAAA, ADA effects-based discrimination claims remain 
rare because most individuals who need reasonable accommodations are eli-
gible for “tier one” status under the ADAAA’s expanded disability defini-
tion.69 However, Congress’s choice to create a category of ADA class mem-
bers ineligible for reasonable accommodations gives new significance to the 
ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions.70 Although the number of 
“tier two” plaintiffs to bring effects-based discrimination claims is likely to 
be small, the mere potential for these claims sheds new light on the ADA’s 
more frequently employed reasonable accommodations provision.  
B. Remedies for Effects-Based Discrimination Resemble Reasonable Ac-
commodations 
To date, widespread misconceptions about the ADA’s effects-based dis-
crimination claims have obscured their overlap with the reasonable accom-
modations provision. Many courts and commentators assume that the ADA’s 
effects-based discrimination provisions cannot require employers to incur ex-
penses that parallel the expenses required by reasonable accommodations.71 
Additionally, many courts and commentators assume that the small number 
of individuals with a specific disability employed by a particular employer 
gives the ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions little practical util-
ity because these small numbers prevent statically valid comparisons be-
tween a policy’s effect on persons with and without disabilities.72  
However, as the follow sections demonstrate, the historical underpin-
nings of effects-based discrimination law and the ADA’s text undermine 
these and other limiting assumptions about the ADA’s effects-based discrim-
ination provisions. In significant ways, the ADA’s effects-based discrimina-
tion claims mirror reasonable accommodations claims.73 Accordingly, in or-
der to fulfill Congress’s intent that “tier one” plaintiffs enjoy more statutory 
protection than “tier two” plaintiffs, courts should interpret the reasonable 
  
 68 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 1981a(a)(2) (2012). Damages are available in reasonable accommoda-
tions, however, only when the employer has not acted in good faith. See id. § 1981a(a)(3) (“damages may 
not be awarded under this section where the [employer] demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation 
with the person with the disability who has informed the [employer] that accommodation is needed, to 
identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an equally effec-
tive opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”). 
 69 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 70 See 29 C.F.R §§ 1630.4–1630.11 (2016). 
 71 See infra notes 75–90 and accompanying text. 
 72 See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 
536 (1991). 
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accommodations provision to provide more robust protection than the 
ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions.74 
1. Employers May Incur Costs 
As Christine Jolls has observed in the Title VII context, close examina-
tion of effects-based discrimination law undermines the assumption that it 
cannot require employers to incur the types of monetary expenses more typ-
ically associated with reasonable accommodations.75  
For example, even a quintessential Title VII disparate impact case, such 
as a sex-based challenge to a requirement that workers’ height exceed six 
feet, may require the employer to incur expenses. In addition to abandoning 
the discriminatory selection criterion, the employer may ultimately expend 
resources to adapt the employers’ uniforms, machinery, and equipment to fit 
shorter workers.76 In this way, classic Title VII disparate impact cases bear 
more similarity to reasonable accommodations than many commentators as-
sume.  
Less typical Title VII disparate impact cases even more directly require 
employers to incur expenses and construct new facilities in a manner that 
resembles reasonable accommodations.77 For example, the EEOC and two 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have indicated that employers who do not currently 
provide their employees sanitary restroom facilities (a practice that dispar-
ately impacts women) must do so in order to avoid Title VII disparate impact 
liability.78 As Mary Crossley has suggested, this remedy “parallel[s] closely 
  
 74 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325 §2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)). 
 75 Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 643, 643, 644–45 
(2001). 
 76 Id. at 645, 656. 
 77 Id. at 651 (“[I]mportant aspects of disparate impact liability under Title VII are in fact accommo-
dation requirements.”). 
 78 DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]nsofar as absence of re-
stroom facilities deters women . . . but not men from seeking or holding a particular type of job, and 
insofar as those facilities can be made available to the employees without undue burden to the employer, 
the absence may violate Title VII.”) (citations omitted); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 
1987) (holding that a plaintiff who proved that unsanitary portable restroom facilities disparately impacted 
women was entitled to summary judgment); Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.2(b)(5) (2009) (“Some States require that separate restrooms be provided for employees of each sex. 
An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if it refuses to hire or 
otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of applicants or employees in order to avoid 
the provision of such restrooms . . . .”). Cf. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270, 
1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“Title VII . . . require[s] employers to provide women-only benefits or other-
wise incur additional expenses on behalf of women in order to treat the sexes the same.” (citing Ariz. 
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 
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the actions one might expect of an employer accommodating a disabled 
worker in order to avoid liability.”79 Tellingly, the courts in these disparate 
impact cases implicitly acknowledge that they are applying analysis compa-
rable to the analysis used for reasonable accommodations claims. In DeClue 
v. Central Illinois Light Co.,80 one of the restroom cases, the Seventh Circuit 
used the ADA term “undue burden” to describe the limits of the employer’s 
duty to remedy the disparate impact created by its lack of sanitary restroom 
facilities.81  
Some commentators have characterized the restroom cases as outside 
the mainstream of disparate impact law because they “compel the employer 
to provide a benefit it is not providing or to do something it is not doing, as 
opposed to challenging a requirement the employer has put in place.”82 How-
ever, the primary case that supports the proposition that a plaintiff cannot use 
Title VII disparate impact law to challenge employer inaction is a 1991 de-
cision by the Seventh Circuit,83 which employs reasoning that other circuits 
have criticized and rejected.84 The Seventh Circuit itself also implicitly abro-
gated its own reasoning when it opined in DeClue, a case in which the plain-
tiff had not even raised a disparate impact claim, that a female employee 
could use the disparate impact theory to challenge an employer’s lack of re-
stroom facilities.85 Accordingly, it appears that the explanation for the rela-
tive scarcity of Title VII disparate impact remedies that require employers to 
build new facilities or purchase new equipment is not that these remedies fall 
outside the normal scope of effects-based discrimination law. Instead, the 
explanation is the relatively small number of circumstances in which the bi-
ological needs of the groups protected by Title VII significantly differ from 
the biological needs of other workers. 
Furthermore, as Mary Crossley has observed, the disparate impact the-
ory’s overlap with reasonable accommodations law has been present from 
  
n.14 (1983)) (holding that an employer’s exclusion of birth control pills from its health insurance plan, 
which provided generally comprehensive prescription coverage, violated Title VII). 
 79 Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Pro-
ject, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 915 (2004). 
 80 223 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2000).  
 81 Id. at 436 (“[I]nsofar as those facilities can be made available to the employees without undue 
burden to the employer, the absence may violate Title VII.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 82 Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White 
Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1562 (2004); see also Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, 
Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 920 n.257 (2006) (agreeing with 
Sullivan that “this could be a particularly broad use of impact theory”). 
 83 EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 84 See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to certify a 
class); Thomas v. Wash. County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 924–26 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that nepotism 
and word-of-mouth hiring practices could result in disparate impact liability under Title VII). 
 85 DeClue, 223 F.3d at 436. 
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disparate impact law’s beginning.86 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,87 the Su-
preme Court decision that first adopted the disparate impact theory, Justice 
Burger used language that signaled that remedies for disparate impact law 
may closely resemble reasonable accommodations.88 Referring to an Aesop’s 
fable in which a fox finds that he cannot drink milk served in a narrow-
mouthed jar designed for a stork, the Griggs Court suggested that disparate 
impact law requires employers to ensure “that the vessel in which the milk is 
proffered be one all seekers can use.”89 In this way, the Court indicated that 
disparate impact law can require employers to incur costs in order to adapt 
existing workplaces to the varying physical needs of historically excluded 
workers.90  
2. Individuated Evidence and Individuated Remedies  
Differences between the ADA’s effects-based claims and Title VII’s 
disparate impact claims make the ADA’s effects-based claims resemble rea-
sonable accommodations even more closely. Unlike Title VII disparate im-
pact claims, which typically require group evidence and group remedies, the 
ADA’s effects-based discrimination claims are more functionally similar to 
reasonable accommodations because they are individualized.  
First, unlike Title VII disparate impact cases, in which courts typically 
require plaintiffs to use statistics or other forms of group-based evidence to 
demonstrate that the challenged policy adversely affects their protected class 
as a group,91 the ADA does not require an effects-based discrimination plain-
tiff to present proof that a challenged employer policy disadvantaged anyone 
other than himself.92 Section 6 is most clear on this point. It prohibits not only 
selection criteria that “screen out or tend to screen out . . . a class of individ-
uals with disabilities,” but also selection criteria “that screen out or tend to 
screen out an individual with a disability.”93 In this way, section 6 permits a 
  
 86 Crossley, supra note 79, at 914. 
 87 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 88 Id. at 431. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. Lower courts even more formally recognized that Griggs overlaps reasonable accommoda-
tions law. One court, for example, suggested that the Griggs decision made Title VII’s religious accom-
modation provision largely “redundant and unnecessary.” Isaac v. Butler’s Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108, 
112 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
 91 See, e.g., Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 38 (D. Me. 1993) (holding that a prima facie 
disparate impact case exists if evidence is presented and shows statistical disparities which are sufficiently 
substantive to raise an inference of causation). 
 92 See, e.g., Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, 176 F.3d 834, 839 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (“In the 
ADA context, a plaintiff may satisfy the second prong of his prima facie case [of disparate impact] by 
demonstrating an adverse impact on himself rather than on an entire group.”). 
 93 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012) (emphasis added).  
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plaintiff to challenge selection criteria that adversely affect him or her with-
out producing evidence that anyone else was similarly disadvantaged.94 ADA 
section 7, which focuses on tests, uses singular language; it refers to “a job 
applicant or employee,” “such applicant or employee,” and “such employee 
or applicant.”95 
Unlike sections 6 and 7, the ADA’s other effects-based discrimination 
provisions do not explicitly authorize an individual plaintiff to bring an ef-
fects-based discrimination claim without evidence that other persons are ad-
versely affected.96 Based on this difference, most commentators assume that 
these provisions require group evidence.97 However, textual differences be-
tween the ADA and Title VII cast doubt on this assumption. Title VII’s dis-
parate impact provision uses the language of groups: it focuses on situations 
  
 94 See Gonzales, 176 F.3d at 839 n.26 (“In the ADA context, a plaintiff may satisfy the second prong 
of his prima facie case [of disparate impact] by demonstrating an adverse impact on himself rather than 
on an entire group.”); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON 
THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § IV-4.3(2) (2002), 
http://www.jan.wvu.edu/links/ADAtam1.html. (“It is not necessary to make statistical comparisons be-
tween a group of people with disabilities and people who are not disabled to show that a person with a 
disability is screened out by a selection standard. . . . As with other determinations under the ADA, the 
exclusionary effect of a selection procedure usually must be looked at in relation to a particular individual 
who has particular limitations caused by a disability.”). In many cases, however, courts have overlooked 
the textual difference between the ADA and Title VII. See, e.g., Crawford v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland 
Sec., 245 Fed. App’x. 369, 381 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s ADA Title I disparate impact 
claim because she “offers no valid statistical evidence”); Smith v. Miami-Dade Cty., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 
1295 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“[E]vidence that one disabled person was adversely affected by a particular em-
ployment practice is not sufficient to create a prima facie case of a disparate impact under the ADA.”); 
Corbin v. Town of Palm Beach, No. 13–80106–CIV, 2014 WL 866415, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2014) 
(“Besides pointing to a specific employment practice that allegedly has a disparate impact, a plaintiff must 
also demonstrate causation by offering statistical evidence to show that the challenged practice has re-
sulted in prohibited discrimination.”) (citation omitted); Gray v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:09–cv–327-APR, 
2013 WL 6682951, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 17, 2013) (“[A] disparate impact claim under the ADA . . . . 
requires statistical correlation evidence . . . .”) (citation omitted); Anderson v. Duncan, 20 F. Supp. 3d 42, 
54 (D.D.C. 2013) (“A prima facie case of disparate impact requires . . . a demonstration of causation 
through statistical evidence . . . .”) (citation omitted); Kintz v. United Parcel Serv., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 
1254 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (“[T]he plaintiff must produce some evidence about the population that a policy 
applies to, some numbers or proportional statistics, . . .”); Slocum v. Potter, No. 3:08–3714–CMC–JRM, 
2010 WL 2756953, at *7 (D.S.C. June 8, 2010) (“Insofar as Slocum now asserts a claim based on a theory 
of disparate impact, it fails . . . . [T]he record contains no statistical evidence . . . .”); Jeffrey v. Ashcroft, 
285 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (indicating that an ADA disparate impact analysis would 
“involv[e] statistical evidence”). 
 95 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (2012). While the remaining disparate impact provision, section 3, does 
not expressly use singular language, it also does not employ plural language. See id. § 12112(b)(3) (pro-
hibiting employers from “utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of 
discrimination on the basis of disability”). 
 96 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (3), (7) (2012). 
 97 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 64, at 27–28 (indicating that 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) falls within 
the disparate impact category that normally requires “group-to-group comparison and is normally done 
on the strength of the statistical evidence”); Stein & Waterstone, supra note 82, at 911. 
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in which employer actions may limit, segregate, or classify “employees or 
applicants.”98 By contrast, the ADA’s parallel provision focuses on situations 
that involve limiting, segregating, or classifying a single “job applicant or 
employee.”99  
Additionally, the affirmative defense the ADA provides employers fac-
ing effects-based discrimination claims is couched in terms of individual, ra-
ther than group, impact. It provides: 
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged 
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or 
tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability 
has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such 
performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, . . .100  
This defense bears the statutory label of “[i]n general,” and functions as 
the affirmative defense for all four of the ADA’s effects-based discrimination 
provisions.101 By emphasizing that employers must justify practices “that 
screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an indi-
vidual with a disability,” this provision suggests that none of the ADA’s ef-
fects-based discrimination claims require evidence of group impact.102 
The ADA’s effects-based claims’ resemblance to reasonable accommo-
dations is also striking from a remedies perspective. To remedy an ADA ef-
fects-based discrimination claim, an employer may make an individualized 
exception to a policy while continuing to apply the policy to other workers.103 
Such individualized remedies rarely occur in the Title VII context because 
ceasing to apply a policy to one Title VII group typically leaves the employer 
vulnerable to “reverse discrimination” claims from members of another Title 
VII group.104 For example, the remedy for a minimum height requirement that 
  
 98 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
 99 Id. § 12112(b)(1). 
 100 Id. § 12113(a) (emphasis added). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. (emphasis added). 
 103 See Matthew A. Shapiro, Labor Goals and Antidiscrimination Norms: Employer Discretion, Rea-
sonable Accommodation, and the Costs of Individualized Treatment, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5–6 
(2013) (“[I]n contrast to Title VII, the ADA typically requires employers to make retail accommodations 
rather than wholesale ones—to fashion individualized exceptions to generally applicable workplace poli-
cies and practices on a case-by-case basis rather than to revise the policies and practices for all employees. 
(Though, to be sure, this is only a generalization: Title VII mandates some retail accommodations, while 
the ADA mandates some wholesale ones.)”). 
 104 Cf. Schwab & Willborn, supra note 66, at 1238 (“The standard judicial remedy in a Title VII 
disparate impact case requires the employer to change the policy or standard for everybody, not just the 
protected group. . . . By contrast, a successful ADA reasonable accommodation case requires the employer 
to take special steps to a particular group, but not for everybody.”); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: 
Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1357, 1399 (2009) (“[T]here is no intrinsic connection between disparate impact liability and 
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disparately impacts women must be to eliminate the requirement for every-
one. Eliminating it only for women would create a “reverse discrimination” 
disparate treatment claim for short men.105 The ADA, by contrast, expressly 
bars “reverse discrimination” claims brought by persons outside the ADA’s 
protected class.106 Accordingly, employers may, if they choose, respond to 
ADA effects-based discrimination claims by making case-by-case excep-
tions to a policy instead of eliminating the policy altogether.107 
In this way, ADA effects-based discrimination claims parallel the small 
category of Title VII disparate impact cases that commentators have charac-
terized as functionally indistinguishable from ADA reasonable accommoda-
tions cases because they permit employers to address the adverse impacts of 
their policies by making case-by-case exceptions.108 For example, in cases 
involving “no beard” policies that disparately impact individuals with the 
skin condition pseudofolliculitis barbae (“PFB”) (a condition that predomi-
nantly affects African Americans), courts have ordered a narrow, rather than 
universal, remedy. They have permitted employers to retain “no beard” pol-
  
universal remedies, just as there is no intrinsic connection between nonaccommodation and individualized 
remedies.”) (citation omitted). 
 105 See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 66, at 1238 (“The standard judicial remedy in a Title VII 
disparate impact case requires the employer to change the policy or standard for everybody, not just the 
protected group. . . . [For instance,] if a high school diploma requirement has a disparate impact on blacks 
that cannot be justified by business necessity, a Title VII court would order the employer to drop the 
requirement for whites as well as blacks.”). 
 106 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (2012) (“Nothing in [the ADA] shall provide the basis for a claim by an 
individual without a disability that the individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual’s 
lack of disability.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill prohibits reverse dis-
crimination claims by disallowing claims based on the lack of disability . . . .”). Even before the ADAAA 
codified the ADA's prohibition of reverse discrimination suits, the ADA’s limited protected class made 
this conclusion easy to reach as a textual matter because unlike Title VII, which prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the ADA pro-
hibited disability discrimination only against “individual[s] with a disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(2006). But see Woods v. Phoenix Soc’y of Cuyahoga Cty., No. 76286, 2000 WL 640566, at *2–3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. May 18, 2000) (permitting a reverse-discrimination suit to proceed on separate common law 
grounds). 
 107 See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 66, at 1238 (“[A] successful ADA reasonable accommoda-
tion case requires the employer to take special steps to a particular group, but not for everybody.”). 
 108 Id. (“The Title VII no-beard cases look like accommodation cases.”); Jolls, supra note 75, at 655 
(“Remedies in the no-beard cases . . . that have been decided in favor of employees nicely highlight the 
fundamental equivalence between disparate impact liability and requirements of accommodation. Courts 
typically have required employers to exempt black men who are unable to shave from rules prohibiting 
beards. Thus, quite directly in these cases, disparate impact liability requires employers to incur special 
costs in response to the distinctive needs (measured against existing market structures) of a particular 
group of employees.”) (footnote omitted). Cf. Zatz, supra note 104, at 1399 (observing that “there is no 
intrinsic connection between disparate impact liability and universal remedies, just as there is no intrinsic 
connection between nonaccommodation and individualized remedies.”) (footnote omitted). 
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icies for everyone who does not submit medical documentation demonstrat-
ing PFB.109 In one of these cases, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged—likely 
unconsciously—the functional similarity between this disparate impact rem-
edy and the remedies the ADA’s reasonable accommodations provision re-
quires by using the ADA term “reasonable accommodation,”110 which is not 
part of Title VII race discrimination doctrine. The court stated that “Dom-
ino’s is free to establish any grooming and dress standards it wishes; we hold 
only that reasonable accommodation must be made for members of the pro-
tected class who suffer from PFB.”111 
This section has demonstrated that the ADA’s effects-based discrimina-
tion provisions are far more similar to the reasonable accommodations pro-
vision than most courts and commentators currently assume. The ADA’s ef-
fects-based discrimination provisions can require employers to incur ex-
penses to remedy inaction that imposes disability-based disadvantage. The 
ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions do not require evidence that 
a challenged employer practice harmed a statistically significant numbers of 
individuals; instead, harm to a single individual may suffice.112 Similarly, the 
ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions authorize remedies in the 
form of individualized exceptions to broadly applicable policies; they do not 
require employers to abandon policies altogether.113 Accordingly, in many 
respects, the ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions authorize “tier 
two” ADA class members to obtain workplace changes that strongly resem-
ble reasonable accommodations. 
III. OVERLAP WITH CURRENT REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS LAW 
Because the ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions remain un-
derstudied and underdeveloped, the precise extent of their overlap with the 
reasonable accommodations provision is difficult to determine. With this 
limitation in mind, this Part examines the ADA’s text and parallel Title VII 
case law to roughly outline the overlap. This examination reveals that the 
claims available to “tier two” ADA plaintiffs duplicate significant portions 
of current reasonable accommodations law.  
The EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance provides that “[i]n general, an ac-
commodation is any change in the work environment or in the way things are 
customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal 
  
 109 See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (allowing employer to 
retain “no beards” rule for employees who fail to submit medical documentation of their inability to 
shave); Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (S.D. Iowa 1984); EEOC v. Trailways, 
Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Colo. 1981). 
 110 Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799. 
 111 Id. (emphasis added). 
 112 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (3), (6), (7) (2012). 
 113 See Shapiro, supra note 103, at 5–6. 
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employment opportunities.”114 The EEOC identifies three types of accommo-
dations that fall within the ambit of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations 
provision: 
(1) accommodations that are required to ensure equal opportunity in the application 
process;  
(2) accommodations that enable the employer’s employees with disabilities to per-
form the essential functions of the position held or desired; and  
(3) accommodations that enable the employer’s employees with disabilities to enjoy 
equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by employees without 
disabilities.115  
The following sections demonstrate that the effects-based discrimina-
tion claims available to “tier two” plaintiffs overlap each of these reasonable 
accommodations categories. 
A. Accommodations to Ensure Equal Opportunity in the Application Pro-
cess 
The ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions most obviously 
overlap the EEOC’s first reasonable accommodations category, which re-
quires employers to ensure equal opportunity in the application process.116 
Section 7, the ADA’s most narrowly targeted effects-based discrimination 
provision, defines discrimination to include  
failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective 
manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee 
who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results 
accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or 
employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sen-
sory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such 
skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).117 
While section 7 does not use the word “accommodation,” it addresses 
the same concern for equal opportunity in the application process as the 
  
 114 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015). The text of the ADA does not define the term “reasonable 
accommodation.” It does, however, provide examples. It declares that:  
The term “reasonable accommodation” may include (A) making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restruc-
turing, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examina-
tions, training materials or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.  
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
 115 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015). 
 116 Id. 
 117 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (2012). 
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EEOC’s first category of reasonable accommodations.118 It requires modifi-
cations to employment tests, such as converting a written test into Braille, 
that the average lay observer would likely call a reasonable accommoda-
tion.119 In fact, section 7’s directive that employers “select and administer 
tests . . . in the most effective manner to ensure that . . . such test results 
accurately reflect [the factor that the] test purports to measure”120 might pos-
sibly require more than the reasonable accommodations provision, which 
courts generally regard to permit employers to select any accommodation 
that is effective, even if it is not “the most effective” option available.121 
The ADA’s other effects-based discrimination provisions, which have 
a broader scope than section 7, also appear to empower “tier two” plaintiffs 
to obtain changes to the application process.122 For example, section 6 pro-
hibits employers from “using qualification standards, employment tests or 
other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with 
a disability . . . unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by 
the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and 
is consistent with business necessity.”123 Similarly, section 1 prohibits em-
ployers from “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or em-
ployee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such ap-
plicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or em-
ployee.”124 Even more broadly, section 3 prohibits employers from “utilizing 
standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of dis-
crimination on the basis of disability . . . .”125 In sum, each of the ADA’s 
overlapping effects-based discrimination provisions enables “tier two” plain-
tiffs to obtain changes to the application process. 
B. Accommodations to Facilitate On-the-Job Performance 
The claims available to “tier two” plaintiffs also overlap the EEOC’s 
second reasonable accommodations category: “accommodations that enable 
the employer’s employees with disabilities to perform the essential functions 
of the position held or desired.”126 Even though section 6 appears limited to 
  
 118 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015). 
 119 Id. 
 120 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 121 Id.; see, e.g., Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[E]mployers are 
not required to provide a perfect accommodation or the very accommodation most strongly preferred by 
the employee.”); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (“[T]he employer providing the accommodation has the ulti-
mate discretion to choose between effective accommodations, . . .”). 
 122 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (3), (6) (2012). 
 123 Id. § 12112(b)(6). 
 124 Id. § 12112(b)(1). 
 125 Id. § 12112(b)(3)(A). 
 126 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630(r) (2015). 
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“selection criteria,”127 the EEOC has concluded that its scope extends to “uni-
formly applied standards, criteria and policies not relating to selection,” such 
as “safety requirements, vision or hearing requirements, walking require-
ments, [and] lifting requirements” that apply to current employees.128 Both 
logic and the text of the ADA support this conclusion. Logically, even though 
employers typically scrutinize employees’ qualifications most exactingly at 
the time of hiring or promotion, employers typically require their employees 
to meet “qualification standards” (such as safety requirements, vision or 
hearing requirements, walking requirements, and lifting requirements) 
throughout their employment.129 Additionally, the ADA expressly provides 
that “[t]he term ‘qualification standards’ may include a requirement that an 
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other indi-
viduals in the workplace.”130 Commentary surrounding this provision sup-
ports the commonsense conclusion that whether a worker poses a direct threat 
is relevant not only to hiring and promotion but also to retention.131 Accord-
ingly, it appears likely that the EEOC is correct that section 6 permits chal-
lenges not solely to hiring and promotion criteria but also to ongoing work-
place policies that screen a current worker out of an employment opportunity 
due to his or her disability.  
Even if the EEOC is incorrect about section 6’s scope, the ADA’s other 
effects-based provisions give “tier two” plaintiffs opportunities to obtain 
workplace changes to facilitate their day-to-day job performance. Section 3 
prohibits employers from “utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of admin-
istration that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability.”132 
Similarly, section 1 defines “discriminate” to include “limiting, segregating, 
or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the 
  
 127 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012). 
 128 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(c) (2015) (“Section 1630.15(c) clarifies that there may be uniformly 
applied standards, criteria and policies not relating to selection that may also screen out or tend to screen 
out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities. Like selection criteria that 
have a disparate impact, non-selection criteria having such an impact may also have to be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, subject to consideration of reasonable accommodation.”); Id. app. § 
1630.10(a) (“This provision is applicable to all types of selection criteria, including safety requirements, 
vision or hearing requirements, walking requirements, lifting requirements, and employment tests.”). 
 129 Cf. Timmons, supra note 61, at 246 (“Courts should construe the disparate impact provisions of 
the ADA as encompassing challenges to policies prohibiting workplace misconduct. The statute's refer-
ence to ‘qualification standards . . . [and] selection criteria’ can be interpreted as including an employer’s 
standards for existing employees to remain qualified as opposed to being selected for discharge. . . . Pol-
icies prohibiting workplace misconduct certainly constitute standards and criteria.”) (footnote omitted). 
 130 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). 
 131 See, e.g., Timmons, supra note 61, at 247 n.348 (“[The direct threat] provision must apply to 
existing employees as well as applicants for hire or promotion; it would not make sense to prohibit an 
employer from terminating an existing employee who—perhaps due to acquiring a contagious disease—
became a direct threat to the health of others in the workplace.”). 
 132 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
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opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability 
of such applicant or employee.”133  
This language parallels Title VII’s disparate impact provision, which 
courts have read to require employers to make significant changes to facili-
tate previously excluded workers’ day-to-day job performance. For example, 
courts have held that Title VII disparate impact law requires employers to 
construct women’s restrooms, discontinue rules that require workers to com-
municate exclusively in the English language, and make medical exceptions 
to “no beard” policies for persons with the skin condition PFB.134 In light of 
these cases, it appears reasonable to assume that the ADA’s effects-based 
discrimination provisions similarly encompass not only the application pro-
cess but also day-to-day business operations.  
Additionally, another ADA provision that operates independently of the 
effects-based discrimination provisions makes very explicit that a specific 
remedy classically labeled a “reasonable accommodation”—reallocating or 
redistributing marginal job functions—is available to “tier two” plaintiffs.135 
The ADA defines the term “qualified individual” to mean “an individual 
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or de-
sires.”136 This unique definition of “qualified” requires employers to excuse 
an individual’s inability to do a job’s marginal functions, even if the individ-
ual is ineligible for reasonable accommodations.137  
Had Congress intended to make the reallocation of marginal job func-
tions a statutory benefit available solely to “tier one” plaintiffs, Congress 
could have defined “qualified” to mean that the individual can perform all 
the job functions the employer has assigned to the position. Under that ap-
proach, the employer would be required to reallocate marginal job functions 
only for individuals eligible for reasonable accommodations. By instead de-
fining “qualified” to mean that the individual simply “can perform the essen-
tial functions,” the ADA enables a “tier two” plaintiff to challenge an em-
ployer’s decision not to hire him on the basis of his inability to perform an 
  
 133 Id. § 12112(b)(1). 
 134 See id. § 2000e-2(a) (“[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); Bradley v. Pizzaco 
of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (permitting a disparate impact challenge to a “no beards” 
rule); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487–88 (9th Cir. 1993) (permitting a disparate impact 
challenge an “English-only” rule). 
 135 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 146–47 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(en banc). 
 136 Id. § 12111(8). 
 137 See Deane, 142 F.3d at 146–47. 
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inessential job function.138 His lack of eligibility for reasonable accommoda-
tions is not a barrier to this claim. 
An en banc Third Circuit decision from 1998 demonstrates that Con-
gress had at least constructive notice that “tier two” plaintiffs would be eli-
gible for the reallocation of marginal job functions.139 In the brief pre-
ADAAA period in which the Third Circuit disallowed “regarded as” plain-
tiffs from bringing reasonable accommodations claims, the Third Circuit 
concluded that the ADA’s text compelled it to reject a three-judge panel’s 
assumption that it was “common sense” that “that any employee, ‘disabled 
or otherwise,’ must be able to perform all the requisite functions of a given 
job,” unless the law provides a reasonable accommodation.140 Despite the in-
tuitive appeal of the panel’s reasoning, the en banc court observed that the 
ADA’s “plain and unambiguous” text defines “qualified” as the ability to 
“perform the essential functions” rather than all job functions.141 Accord-
ingly, the en banc court concluded that “if an individual can perform the es-
sential functions of the job without accommodation as to those functions, 
regardless of whether the individual can perform the other functions of the 
job (with or without accommodation), that individual is qualified under the 
ADA.”142 Although there is no evidence that any members of Congress read 
this decision, it highlighted, long before the ADAAA’s enactment, that dis-
allowing certain ADA class members to access the ADA’s reasonable ac-
commodations provision would not prevent them from obtaining remedies 
that overlap current reasonable accommodations law. 
C. Accommodations to Enable Equal Opportunity to Enjoy Benefits 
and Privileges of Employment  
The ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions also overlap the 
EEOC’s third, and most contested, reasonable accommodations category: 
“accommodations that enable the employer’s employees with disabilities to 
enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by employ-
ees without disabilities.”143 These accommodations include making accessi-
ble “non-work areas used by the employer’s employees,” such as break 
  
 138 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 139 See Deane, 142 F.3d at 146–47 (3d Cir. 1998). When the Third Circuit later concluded that the 
ADA requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” to “regarded as” plaintiffs, its deter-
mination that the essential functions limitation applies to persons ineligible for reasonable accommoda-
tions became moot. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
 140 Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 96-7174, at *19 (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1997), rev’d, 142 F.3d 138, 
146 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
 141 Deane, 142 F.3d at 146 (emphasis added). 
 142 Id. at 147. 
 143 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015); id. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii). 
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rooms and lunch rooms.144 They also include accommodations necessary to 
provide employees with disabilities “an opportunity to attain the same level 
of performance . . . as are available to the average similarly situated employee 
without a disability.”145  
Not all courts accept the EEOC’s conclusion that the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodations provision extends beyond enabling individuals with disa-
bilities to minimally perform their job’s essential functions.146 Instead, some 
courts insist that proof that the plaintiff cannot perform all the job’s essential 
functions without accommodation is “an essential element of the [plaintiff’s] 
prima facie case of discrimination based on failure to accommodate.”147 
  
 144 Id. app. § 1630.2(o). 
 145 Id. app. § 1630.9. 
 146 See Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171, 1178 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The plaintiff must first demonstrate 
that without the requested accommodation, he is unable to perform the essential functions of his job. . . . 
The employer need only provide reasonable accommodations that make it possible for the disabled em-
ployee to perform the essential functions of his job.”) (citations omitted); Davis v. Chao, No. 06 C 1066, 
2008 WL 905184, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2008) (expressing skepticism about whether “a person such 
as [the plaintiff] who can admittedly perform all the essential functions of her job could be entitled to a 
reasonable accommodation”); Dage v. Leavitt, No. 04–0221 (JGP), 2007 WL 81961, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 
9, 2007) (“It is well-settled that in asserting discrimination based on failure to accommodate, the moving 
party must establish that ‘an accommodation was needed’ in order to carry out the essential functions of 
the position.” (quoting Bissell v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 (D. Md. 1999))); Goodman v. Potter, 412 
F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The government is not obligated under the statute to provide plaintiff 
with every [requested] accommodation, but only with reasonable accommodation as is necessary to enable 
[her] to perform [her] essential functions.” (quoting Carter v. Bennett, 651 F.Supp. 1299, 1301 (D.D.C. 
1987))); Bissell v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 (D. Md. 1999) (“[A]ll of the evidence in the record 
indicates that [the plaintiff] was ‘fully successful’ on all six categories of her performance evaluation . . . 
and that she was entirely capable of carrying out its functions, essential and otherwise, without the re-
quested accommodation . . . . As a result, [she] has failed to establish an essential element of the prima 
facie case of discrimination based on failure to accommodate: that ‘an accommodation was needed’ in 
order to carry out the essential functions of the position.” (quoting Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171, 1175 
(6th Cir. 1997))); Harmer v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300, 1307 (E.D. Va. 1993) (“[B]ecause 
the evidence established that [the plaintiff] could at all times adequately perform his employment duties, 
[he] is not entitled to further accommodation under the ADA.”).  
  This is the minority view. Most courts accept the EEOC’s position. See Feist v. La., Dep’t of 
Justice, 730 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A] modification that enables an individual to perform the 
essential functions of a position is only one of three categories of reasonable accommodation.”) (footnote 
omitted); Buckingham v. U.S., 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[C]ontrary to what the government 
urges, employers are not relieved of their duty to accommodate when employees are already able to per-
form the essential functions of the job. Qualified handicapped employees who can perform all job func-
tions may require reasonable accommodation to allow them to [] enjoy the privileges and benefits of 
employment equal to those enjoyed by non-handicapped employees . . . .”); McWright v. Alexander, 982 
F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992) (“We . . . reject the district court’s suggestion that [the plaintiff’s] claim 
was defective because the accommodation she requested ‘was not related to any specific condition of her 
work.’ . . . The Rehabilitation Act calls for reasonable accommodations that permit handicapped individ-
uals to lead normal lives, not merely accommodations that facilitate the performance of specific employ-
ment tasks.”) (citation omitted). 
 147 Bissell, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
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Based on this conclusion, one court held that an employer had no obligation 
to provide an employee with a pulmonary disability the smoke-free work en-
vironment his doctor recommended because the plaintiff’s receipt of satis-
factory performance evaluations indicated that the smoke present in his work 
environment did not prevent him from performing his job’s essential func-
tions.148 Similarly, another court denied accommodations to an employee 
with Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome (“MCSS”) because “through-
out the entire time of her struggle with MCSS, she has been able to perform 
her job well, as evidenced by consistently favorable job evaluations.”149 The 
court reached this conclusion even after accepting the plaintiff’s assertion 
that the fumes in her work environment not only occasionally prevented her 
from performing the essential functions of her job but also caused nausea, 
headaches, hair loss, and memory loss.150  
These courts’ conclusions not only conflict with the ADA’s basic dis-
crimination provisions, which explicitly encompass discrimination in “terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment,” but also the ADA’s effects-based 
discrimination provisions.151 The ADA’s affirmative defense to effects-based 
discrimination claims requires employers to justify not only practices “that 
screen out or tend to screen out” an individual with a disability but also prac-
tices that “otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disabil-
ity.”152 In this way, the ADA indicates that the ADA’s effects-based discrim-
ination provisions encompass ongoing employer practices that undermine an 
individual with a disability’s opportunity to enjoy the benefits and privileges 
of employment that his or her coworkers enjoy. 
Title VII disparate impact case law supports the conclusion that the 
ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions encompass situations in 
which an employer subjects an individual with a disability “to harsher work-
ing conditions than the general employee population.”153 For example, the 
  
 148 Harmer, 831 F. Supp. at 1306–07. 
 149 Gordon v. Safeway, Inc., No. 39671–4–I, 1997 WL 679660, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 1997) 
(analyzing both the ADA and state law). 
 150 Id. at *1.  
 151 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified indi-
vidual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”). 
 152 Id. § 12113(a) (emphasis added).  
 153 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Lynch v. Freeman, 817 
F.2d 380, 387 (6th Cir. 1987) (“We reject TVA’s argument that working conditions may never be the 
basis of disparate impact claims. . . . The language of section 703(a)(2) is . . . broad enough to include 
working conditions that have an adverse impact on a protected group of employees. It is an unlawful 
employment practice under § 703(a)(2) ‘to limit . . . employees . . . in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex.’ The condition of the toilets did ‘limit’ female . . . em-
ployees in a way that adversely affected their status as employees based solely on their sex.”); Charles A. 
Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 977 
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Ninth Circuit has permitted workers who speak English as a second language 
to challenge rules requiring them to communicate exclusively in English 
while at work.154 The court permitted this challenge despite the fact that the 
plaintiffs continued to work for the defendant employer.155 In this way, the 
court concluded that Title VII disparate impact law encompasses not only 
situations in which protected individuals lose their jobs, but also situations in 
which protected individuals face unequally burdensome working condi-
tions.156 
Furthermore, the Title VII restroom cases indicate that disparate impact 
law authorizes not only challenges to policies that an employer consciously 
adopts, such as “no beard” or “English-only” rules, but also to employer in-
action.157 In Lynch v. Freeman158 and DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co., the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits concluded that Title VII disparate impact law 
could address the impact that the absence of sanitary toilet facilities had on 
female employees’ working conditions.159 They concluded that Title VII dis-
parate impact law may require employers to purchase equipment or construct 
new facilities in order to equalize biologically different individuals’ working 
conditions due to their membership in a protected class.160 
In sum, the ADA’s effects-based discrimination claims overlap all three 
of the EEOC’s categories of reasonable accommodations. The overlap is 
most obvious for “category 1” reasonable accommodations, which encom-
pass employment tests and qualification standards. However, the ADA’s text 
and comparable Title VII case law indicate that the overlap also extends to 
“category 2” accommodations that enable employees to perform their job’s 
essential functions. Additionally, the overlap appears to extend even to the 
EEOC’s occasionally contested “category 3” accommodations, which enable 
employees to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment. 
The significant overlap between reasonable accommodations doctrine 
and the claims available to “tier two” plaintiffs suggests that there is room 
for advocates to urge courts to expand the scope of reasonable accommoda-
tions. Congress’s choice to deny “tier two” plaintiffs reasonable accommo-
dations claims indicates that Congress expects that the workplace changes 
available via the reasonable accommodations provision will exceed those 
available via the other ADA effect-based discrimination claims. 
  
(2005) (“Although most disparate impact cases have focused on selection devices or discrete policies, the 
statutory language is far broader . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 154 See Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1487–88. 
 155 See id. at 1483. 
 156 See id. at 1485–86. 
 157 DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2000); Lynch, 817 F.2d at 388. 
 158 817 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 159 DeClue, 223 F.3d at 436–37; Lynch 817 F.2d at 387. 
 160 See DeClue, 223 F.3d at 437; Lynch 817 F.2d at 388. 
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IV. HOW REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS LAW SHOULD EXPAND TO 
FULFILL CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO PRIORITIZE "TIER ONE" 
PLAINTIFFS 
The assumption that reasonable accommodations should extend beyond 
other ADA claims predates the ADAAA. The original ADA’s text indicates 
that the statute’s drafters and supporters expected the ADA’s reasonable ac-
commodations provision to provide persons with disabilities greater leverage 
to achieve workplace change than Title VII’s disparate impact provisions.161 
Although the ADA’s individualized approach to effects-based discrimination 
partly accomplished this goal, Congress also anticipated that reasonable ac-
commodations claims would extend beyond the ADA’s effects-based dis-
crimination claims.162 
This expectation is perhaps most clear in the ADA’s affirmative defense 
to effects-based discrimination claims. This defense provides that even when 
an employer demonstrates that a challenged employment practice is “job-
related and consistent with business necessity,” employers have an addi-
tional, separate obligation (for plaintiffs eligible for reasonable accommoda-
tions) to demonstrate that “performance cannot be accomplished by reason-
able accommodation.”163 This pairing of the classic disparate impact defense, 
“job-related and consistent with business necessity,” with “reasonable ac-
commodation” strongly suggests that Congress expected the reasonable ac-
commodations provision to extend beyond the ADA’s effects-based discrim-
ination provisions.164 
Courts may employ this insight to resolve three of the most intractable 
questions about the scope of the reasonable accommodations obligation. 
First, the renewed significance that the ADAAA’s stratification of the ADA’s 
protected class places on the ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions 
invites reexamination of the “practical burden of proof dilemma” in reason-
able accommodations cases.165 Second, the ADAAA’s stratification of the 
ADA’s protected class provides courts an opportunity to reconsider whether 
to defer to employers’ views about which elements of a job are “essential 
  
 161 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15 (2015). 
 162 Id. 
 163 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012). See also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(a) (2015). (“[E]ven if the crite-
rion is job-related and consistent with business necessity, an employer could not exclude an individual 
with a disability if the criterion could be met or job performance accomplished with a reasonable accom-
modation. For example, suppose an employer requires, as part of its application process, an interview that 
is job-related and consistent with business necessity. The employer would not be able to refuse to hire a 
hearing impaired applicant because he or she could not be interviewed. This is so because an interpreter 
could be provided as a reasonable accommodation that would allow the individual to be interviewed, and 
thus satisfy the selection criterion.”).  
 164 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012). 
 165 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002). 
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functions.”166 Third, Congress’s intent to provide “tier one” ADA plaintiffs 
more statutory muscle to compel workplace change than “tier two” plaintiffs 
may also facilitate resolution of the longstanding controversy about the 
ADA’s reassignment provision.167 
A. The Burden of Proof Should Rest on Employers  
Because reasonable accommodations questions are highly fact-inten-
sive, and many issues surrounding reasonable accommodations remain unre-
solved, it is significant which party bears ultimate responsibility for convinc-
ing the fact-finder.168 Commentators who have attempted to create a descrip-
tive account of reasonable accommodations law conclude “that trying to pre-
dict whether an accommodation will be deemed reasonable is difficult”169 be-
cause the case law is “in a state of chaos.”170 Courts and commentators disa-
gree about the extent to which myriad factors, such as positive and negative 
effects on coworkers, should impact the reasonableness inquiry.171 Similarly, 
courts vary widely in their attitudes toward a variety of frequently requested 
accommodations, such as reassignment, accommodations related to parking 
and transportation, and working at home.172  
Accordingly, in a significant number of cases, the inquiry into whether 
the ADA requires a proposed accommodation may be so difficult for the fact-
  
 166 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (2015). 
 167 See id. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). 
 168 See Porter, supra note 4, at 543–44 (“‘Reasonable,’ under the ADA, has no specific definition in 
the statute or its accompanying regulations. It is an ambiguous word with different meanings in different 
areas of law but no discernible meaning in disability law.”) (footnotes omitted); Porter, supra note 12 at 
68 (“[T]he word ‘reasonable’ is so vague; it is not defined in the statute, and the regulations do not ex-
plicitly define it.”) (footnote omitted); Stein et. al., supra note 1, at 714 (“[T]here is little precedent to 
assure a challenging party that a particular accommodation will be found reasonable and not to constitute 
an undue hardship. . . . The judiciary’s reluctance to adumbrate the issue of reasonable accommodation 
has left a dearth of precedent and many issues unresolved.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 169 Porter, supra note 4, at 546. 
 170 Id. at 543. 
 171 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 840 (2008) 
(arguing that “Courts and agencies interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) generally as-
sume that workplace accommodations benefit individual employees with disabilities and impose costs on 
employers and, at times, coworkers. This belief reflects a failure to recognize a key feature of ADA ac-
commodations: their benefits to third parties. Numerous accommodations—from ramps to ergonomic fur-
niture to telecommuting initiatives—can create benefits for coworkers, both disabled and nondisabled, . . 
.”). 
 172 Porter, supra note 4, at 547–52. 
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finder that the question of which party bears the burden of proof may be out-
come-determinative.173 Perhaps of even more practical importance, the deter-
mination of who bears the risk associated with carrying this burden may af-
fect the parties’ perceptions of the potential risks and rewards of litigation, 
which will influence whether an employer chooses to deny an employee’s 
accommodation request in the first place. 
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,174 the only Supreme Court decision to 
address Title I’s reasonable accommodations obligation,175 the Supreme 
Court concluded that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the question 
of whether an accommodation is “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in 
the run of cases.”176 Although this burden is relatively light, Barnett had ar-
gued that his burden should be lighter: he argued it should be limited to 
demonstrating that the accommodation would be effective.177 In support of 
this argument, Barnett emphasized that the ADA requires the employer to 
bear the burden of proof on whether an accommodation imposes an “undue 
hardship.”178 As Mark Weber has subsequently emphasized, the fact that the 
ADA provides a detailed definition for the term “undue hardship” but no 
definition of “reasonable” suggests that courts should understand “reasona-
ble” and “undue hardship” not as two separate hurdles but instead as alternate 
descriptions of the same statutory limit on defendants’ duty to accommo-
date.179 This view of the statute suggests that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Barnett, defendants should bear the entire burden of proof on the 
scope of their accommodation obligations.180 
The ADAAA’s stratification of the ADA’s protected class provides an 
additional argument for placing the burden of proof solely on the employer. 
The effects-based discrimination claims available to disfavored “tier two” 
plaintiffs place the entire burden of persuading the fact-finder about the ap-
propriateness of changing standard operating procedure on the employer.181 
To avoid liability, the employer must prove, as an affirmative defense, that a 
policy that screens the plaintiff out is “job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.”182 Unlike the reasonable accommodations proof structure the 
Supreme Court created in Barnett, the ADA’s effects-based discrimination 
provisions do not require plaintiffs to demonstrate that a waiver or modifica-
  
 173 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002); Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 
681–82 (5th Cir. 2011); Riechmann v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1296 (D. Kan. 2001). 
 174 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 175 Weber, supra note 3, at 1124. 
 176 US Airways, 535 U.S. at 401. 
 177 Id. at 399. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Weber, supra note 3, at 1165–66. 
 180 See id. 
 181 Id. at 1149–50. 
 182 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012).  
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tion of the challenged policy is “reasonable on its face” or reasonable “ordi-
narily or in the run of cases.”183 Instead, they must simply (1) identify the 
policy, (2) demonstrate that the policy screened them out due to their impair-
ment, and (3) demonstrate that they are “otherwise qualified” for the desired 
position.184 The burden of proof on the question of whether the employer must 
waive or modify the policy rests solely on the employer.185  
To ensure that the reasonable accommodations remedies available 
solely to “tier one” class members are not more difficult for plaintiffs to ob-
tain than the parallel remedies available to “tier two” plaintiffs, the Supreme 
Court should consider making the plaintiff’s burden for reasonable accom-
modations claims more similar to the plaintiff’s burden for effects-based dis-
crimination claims. In other words, the Supreme Court should consider lim-
iting the plaintiff’s burden in a reasonable accommodations case to (1) 
demonstrating that the accommodation will be effective, (2) demonstrating 
that the plaintiff’s disability creates the need for accommodation, and (3) 
demonstrating that the plaintiff is “otherwise qualified” for the desired posi-
tion.186 The remaining question of whether the ADA requires the accommo-
dation should rest solely on the employer’s arguments that the proposed ac-
commodation constitutes an undue hardship.187 
B. The Essential Functions Provision Should Not Circumvent the Undue 
Burden Analysis 
Relatedly, the ADAAA’s stratification of the ADA’s protected class 
provides courts an opportunity to reexamine their deference to employers’ 
  
 183 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002). 
 184 Atkins v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 667, 681 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Once an employee shows that a qualifica-
tion standard tends to screen out an individual with a disability, the employer shoulders the burden of 
proving that the challenged standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity.” (quoting Rohr 
v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 862 (9th Cir. 2009))). 
 185 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012); cf. Riechmann v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 
1296 (D. Kan. 2001) (“[T]he Title VII disparate impact and business necessity principles set forth in 
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), should apply to analogous cases under the Rehabilitation 
Act in which employers used tests or other selection criteria that tended to screen out handicapped per-
sons.”). 
 186 Additionally, the fact that “tier one” plaintiffs may bring “disparate impact on one” claims as 
well as reasonable accommodation claims makes it seem unlikely that Congress intended that plaintiffs 
bear any burden on whether an employer must provide a particular accommodation, other than proving 
that they are eligible for accommodations and that the proposed accommodation will be effective. It seems 
unlikely that Congress would have wanted “tier one” plaintiffs to choose between sharing the burden of 
proof and damages. Some plaintiffs may plead in the alternative: leading with a reasonable accommoda-
tion claim in order to obtain damages and then, if that fails, arguing “disparate impact on one,” which 
places the burden of proof solely on the defendant. It seems unlikely Congress intended to introduce this 
unnecessarily complex proof structure. 
 187 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(A) (2012). 
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views about which elements of a job are “essential functions” that cannot be 
altered via the reasonable accommodations provision.188 As originally con-
ceived, the essential functions limitation’s role was to prevent employers 
from excluding individuals with disabilities for their inability to perform mi-
nor tasks that were not essential to the position they sought.189 However, as 
Michelle Travis has observed, employers have skillfully turned the essential 
functions provision to their advantage by capitalizing on two lines of prece-
dent related to the essential functions limitation.190 The first provides that 
eliminating an essential function is never a reasonable accommodation.191 
The second provides that courts should consider employers’ views about 
which job functions are essential.192 With these precedents in mind, employ-
ers and their advisors cleverly craft job descriptions that effectively label the 
absence of a need for accommodation as an “essential job function.”193  
For example, even though the text of the ADA indicates that “[t]he term 
‘reasonable accommodation’ may include . . . job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules,”194 employers have successfully argued that the 
ability to rotate every two weeks between day, evening, and overnight shifts 
is an essential job function.195 Similarly, even though the EEOC concludes 
that unpaid leave may be a reasonable accommodation,196 some courts have 
  
 188 Id. § 12111(8) (“[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions 
of a job are essential, . . . .”). 
 189 Id. (“The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds 
or desires.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015) (“The term essential functions means the fundamental job 
duties of the employment position . . . [and] does not include the marginal functions of the position.”). 
 190 See Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying Universality under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689, 1697 (2015) (observing that “the ‘essential functions’ 
component of the qualifications test has become the critical source for undermining the ADAAA.”). 
 191 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015) (“An employer or other covered entity is not required to real-
locate essential functions.”). 
 192 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012) (“[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to 
what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before adver-
tising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential 
functions of the job.”).  
 193 See Travis, supra note 190, at 1699–1702 (collecting evidence demonstrating that employer-side 
advocates have advised employers to draft broad job descriptions in order to prepare to defend against 
failure to accommodate claims).  
 194 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012). 
 195 See, e.g., Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 359 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that shift rotation was 
an essential function of the plaintiff’s job); see also Tucker v. Mo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., No. 2:11–CV–
04134–NKL, 2012 WL 6115604, at *4–6 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2012) (accepting employer’s assertion that 
the ability to work the day, evening, and overnight shifts was an essential job function). 
 196 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015) (identifying unpaid leave as an accommodation). 
178 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:1 
accepted employers’ assertions that “regularly attending work on-site is es-
sential to most jobs.”197  
When courts permit employers to reframe the ability to work without a 
reasonable accommodation as an essential job function, employers circum-
vent the critical inquiry that the ADA requires: whether a requested accom-
modation (such as avoiding the overnight shift or taking an unpaid leave) 
would impose an undue burden on the employer’s business. In lieu of this 
inquiry, some courts appear to apply an analysis akin to the defense applica-
ble to effects-based discrimination claims, which permits employers to avoid 
liability by proving that the challenged policy is job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.198  
In perhaps the most explicit example of this approach, the Sixth Circuit 
in E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co.199 applied the “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity”200 test to uphold an employer’s refusal to permit telecom-
muting as a reasonable accommodation.201 It held that employers are entitled 
to summary judgment when the employer’s judgment that a particular job 
function (such as physical presence at the employer’s worksite) is essential 
is “job-related, uniformly-enforced, and consistent with business neces-
sity.”202 
The ADAAA’s stratified protected class highlights the problem with 
applying this deferential “job-related, uniformly-enforced, and consistent 
with business necessity” defense to reasonable accommodations claims.203 As 
discussed above, this defense applies to “tier two” plaintiffs’ effects-based 
discrimination claims. Accordingly, if a shift rotation or “no telecommuting” 
policy screens out a “tier two” plaintiff, the employer may avoid liability 
simply by demonstrating that the policy is “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.”204 In order to fulfill Congress’s intent for “tier one” 
plaintiffs to have more statutory muscle to compel workplace change than 
“tier two” plaintiffs, courts should not apply the “job related and consistent 
with business necessity” standard to accommodation claims.205 They should 
instead apply the more demanding undue burden analysis, which uniquely 
applies to the reasonable accommodations claims available only to “tier one” 
class members. 
  
 197 EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 761 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). See also Basden v. Prof’l 
Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013); Brown v. Honda of Am., No. 2:10-cv-459, 2012 WL 
4061795, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2012). 
 198 Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 765–66.  
 199 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 200 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012). 
 201 Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d at 766. 
 202 Id. (quoting Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc. 268 F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 203 Id. 
 204 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012).  
 205 Id. 
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C. Reassignment Preferences Should Be Available to “Tier One” Plain-
tiffs 
Congress’s intent to provide “tier one” ADA plaintiffs more statutory 
muscle to compel workplace change than “tier two” plaintiffs may also facil-
itate resolution of the longstanding controversy about the ADA provision 
naming “[r]eassignment to a vacant position” as a “reasonable accommoda-
tion.”206  
Some courts, hewing closely to the ADA’s text, conclude that when no 
reasonable accommodation would enable an employee with a disability to 
remain in his or her current job, the employer must reassign the employee to 
a vacant position for which the employee is qualified, even if another em-
ployee with superior qualifications also expresses interest in the vacant posi-
tion and the employer would normally hire the most qualified applicant.207 
These courts emphasize that the statute expressly identifies “[r]eassignment 
to a vacant position” as a “reasonable accommodation.”208 They reason that 
because other ADA provisions already require employers to permit employ-
ees with disabilities to compete on an equal basis with other employees, the 
reassignment provision must require employers to do more for employees 
whose disabilities prevent them from continuing in their current positions.209 
Accordingly, they conclude that the reassignment provision requires employ-
ers to transfer such persons to vacant positions for which they are qualified, 
even if a more highly qualified employee requests to be transferred as well.210 
Other courts, by contrast, are unwilling to conclude that the ADA’s re-
assignment accommodation requires employers to prefer persons with disa-
bilities over more qualified applicants when the employer would normally 
rely on merit-based selection.211 They reason that doing so would amount to 
“affirmative action with a vengeance” and “giving a job to someone solely 
on the basis of his status as a member of a statutorily protected group.”212 As 
  
 206 Id. § 12111(9)(B); Anderson, supra note 7, at 1–2 (“One of the most controversial provisions of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the duty to reassign an employee with disabilities to a vacant 
position as a form of reasonable accommodation.”) (footnote omitted); Befort & Donesky, supra note 7, 
at 1056 (“Of all the accommodations listed in the ADA, the reassignment accommodation has generated 
the most litigation and fueled the greatest amount of controversy.”) (footnote omitted). The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide this issue but subsequently dismissed the case when the parties settled. 
See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 552 U.S. 1136 (2008) (dismissing writ of certiorari). 
 207 See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka v. 
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 208 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012). See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1302. 
 209 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1302. 
 210 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1302. 
 211 See, e.g., Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007); Daugherty v. City 
of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 212 Huber, 486 F.3d at 484 (quoting EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 
2000)). 
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these statements suggest, these courts find it difficult to characterize an ab-
solute right to reassignment as the removal of an arbitrary barrier to equal 
employment opportunity.213 They note that it appears more analogous to a 
disability-based preference than “requiring the employer to rectify a situation 
(such as lack of wheelchair access) that is of his own doing.”214  
The ADAAA’s stratified protected class provides a new tool to navigate 
this longstanding dispute. By creating a secondary category of ADA plain-
tiffs ineligible for “reasonable accommodation” claims but eligible for ef-
fects-based discrimination claims, the ADAAA directs courts to read the 
ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” provision more broadly than the 
ADA’s effects-based discrimination provisions. In this way, the ADAAA 
suggests that the fact that an absolute right to reassignment “fits uncomfort-
ably at best”215 with disparate impact law may not be sufficient reason to con-
clude that an absolute right to reassignment is not a reasonable accommoda-
tion. Courts may adopt a robust reading of the ADA’s reassignment provision 
in order to implement congressional intent that the ADA should provide 
greater benefits to “tier one” ADA plaintiffs than to “tier two” plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that the ADAAA’s stratified class provides a 
new argument for expanding reasonable accommodations law. By creating a 
secondary tier of protected class members ineligible for reasonable accom-
  
 213 See Crossley, supra note 79, at 942 n.348 (“Certainly, if it is conclusively established that the 
ADA requires [an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position even when a better 
qualified employee or applicant seeks that position], then the reassignment accommodation will function 
much like affirmative action in preferring a group member over a non-group member. . . . It is difficult to 
imagine how giving an already-employed disabled person a right of reassignment to a position for which 
he is qualified, but not the best qualified, is meant to compensate that individual for the lingering effects 
of discrimination against people with disabilities.”). 
 214 Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by EEOC v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 215 Mary Crossley, supra note 79, at 943 n.348. See also Anderson, supra note 9, at 1315 (“By grant-
ing individuals with disabilities the right to an open position, even if there are other, more qualified indi-
viduals the employer ordinarily would choose, the ADA in effect creates a straight-forward preference for 
individuals with disabilities.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1315–16 (noting that “[c]ommentators who have 
argued that reasonable accommodation is not different, that it fits within the realm of already-existing 
anti-discrimination doctrine, conspicuously avoid mentioning reassignment in their arguments.”); Befort 
& Donesky, supra note 7 at 1059 (“[T]he reassignment accommodation has the effect of providing a 
preference to the rights of the disabled over those of the non-disabled.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1082 
(“The similarities between reasonable accommodation and affirmative action are most acute when the 
accommodation in question is reassignment. For reassignment, as with affirmative action, protected class 
status serves as a preferential basis for selecting someone to fill a job position.”); Ruth Colker, Hypercap-
italism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under 
United States Law, 9 YALE J. L & FEMINISM 213, 222 (1997) (“The controversy surrounding whether or 
not the ADA is an ‘affirmative action’ statute is largely centered on [the reassignment provision].”). 
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modations, the ADAAA casts a spotlight on other ADA provisions that re-
quire workplace change. Close examination of the ADA’s long-dormant ef-
fects-based discrimination provisions reveals that the workplace changes 
they require substantially overlap the workplace changes required by current 
reasonable accommodations doctrine. Therefore, in order to fulfill Con-
gress’s intent to provide “tier one” class members more statutory muscle to 
compel workplace change than “tier two” class members, courts should re-
visit pre-ADAAA assumptions about the scope and proof structure surround-
ing reasonable accommodations claims. 
 
